In models with heterogeneous firms trade integration has a positive impact on aggregate productivity through the selection of the best firms as import competition drives the least productive ones out of the market. To quantify the impact of firm selection, we calibrate and simulate a multi-country multi-sector model with monopolistic competition and variable markups using firm-level data and aggregate trade figures on a panel of 11 EU countries. We find that EU trade has a sizeable impact on aggregate productivity. In 2000 autarky would have caused an average productivity loss of roughly 13 per cent, a third of which would have still occurred if trade barriers had returned to 1980 levels. Productivity losses, however, vary a lot across countries and sectors depending on market accessibility and trade costs. We provide evidence that our results are robust to alternative distance and productivity measures.
Introduction
In recent models with heterogeneous firms international trade integration has a positive impact on aggregate productivity through the selection of the best firms Melitz, 2003) . The reason is a combination of import competition and export market access. On the one hand, as lower trade costs allow foreign producers to target the domestic markets, the operating profits of domestic firms in those markets shrink whatever their productivities. On the other hand, some domestic firms gain access to foreign markets and get additional profits from their foreign ventures. These are the firms that are productive enough to cope with the remaining costs of foreign activity (such as those due to transportation and remaining administrative duties or institutional and cultural barriers). The result is the partition of the initially active domestic firms in three groups. As they start making losses in their home markets without gaining access to foreign markets, the least productive firms are forced to exit. On the contrary, as they are able to compensate lost profits on home sales with new profits on foreign sales, the most productive firms survive and expand their market shares. Finally, firms with intermediate levels of productivity also survive but, not being productive enough to access foreign markets, are relegated to home sales only and their market shares fall. Since international trade integration eliminates the least productive firms, average productivity grows through the reallocation of productive resources from less to more efficient producers.
This mechanism finds empirical support in firm-level analyses that have tried to identify the direction of causation hidden in the positive correlation between the export status of a firm and its productivity (called 'exceptional exporter performance' by Bernard and Jensen, 1999) . This is a crucial issue for trade policy. Causation going from export status to firm performance would reveal the existence of 'learning by exporting' and therefore call for export promotion. However, apart from peculiar cases, most of the evidence supports reverse causation in the form of 'selection into export status': firms that already perform better have a stronger propensity to export than other firms (Tybout, 2002) . Selection comes with two additional effects that are consistent with the theoretical argument discussed above. First, exposure to trade forces the least productive firms to shut down (Bernard and Jensen, 1999 ; Aw, Chung and Roberts, 2000; Clerides, Lach and Tybout, 1998). Second, trade liberalization leads to market share reallocations towards the most productive firms (Pavcnik, 2002; Bernard, Jensen and Schott 2003) . On both counts, aggregate average productivity improves.
The empirical relevance of the selection effect motivates additional efforts towards quantifying its contribution in terms of gains from trade. This line of research is pursued by through the simulation of counterfactual scenarios. Those authors start with noting that the differences in measured productivity (e.g. value added per worker) across firms can be generated only by theoretical models assuming imperfect competition. Two options are then available. Differences can be derived from constant markups (i.e. Dixit-Stiglitz monopolistic competition) as well as fixed costs of entry and of exporting. This is the option chosen by Melitz (2003) . Alternatively, those differences can be obtained from variable markups even without any fixed cost. This is the option chosen by , who propose a model obtained by introducing Bertrand competition in the probabilistic Ricardian framework developed by Eaton and Kortum (2002) . They then calibrate the parameters of their model on U.S. data. In particular, they use aggregate production and trade data among the 47 leading U.S. export destinations (including the U.S. itself) to calibrate the parameters governing geographic barriers, aggregate technology differences, and differences in input costs. U.S. plant level data are used, instead, to calibrate the parameters that relate to the heterogeneity of goods in production and consumption. Finally, the calibrated model is used to assess the impacts of various counterfactual scenarios. In the focal one, report a 4.7 percent increase in the average productivity of U.S. firms resulting from a 5 percent reduction in world trade barriers. 1 The counterfactual analysis by reveals the empirical tractability of their model. Their treatment of market structure has, however, some theoretical shortcoming. Specifically, a certain good in a certain country is always supplied by one firm only. This is the lowest-cost supplier of that good to that country. Indeed, under Bertrand competition, all other firms are kept out through limit pricing: the lowest-cost producer quotes a price that matches the second-lowest cost of supplying that good to that country. Accordingly, to derive the price and markup quoted for each good in each country, one needs to know which firms are the lowest and the second-lowest cost suppliers from each potential source country. This problem becomes tractable if one is ready to assume that in each country the lowest and the second-lowest costs are realizations of random variables drawn from probability distributions. In this respect, show that the Fréchet family yields tractable distributions for prices and markups along with simple expressions for bilateral trade shares. Differently, building on monopolistic competition, the model by Melitz (2003) allows many producers with different costs to simultaneously serve the same market, which is is consistent with arm-chair evidence. This model, however, is analytically tractable only if countries are identical and all bilateral trade barriers are the same. This clearly undermines empirical calibration and makes the model a fairly unpromising tool to deal with counterfactual analysis. Moreover, its implication of constant and equal markups across all firms, no matter where they produce and sell, flies in the face of empirical evidence showing that markups do vary across firms and markets.
The aim of the present paper is to supplement the existing literature in two respects. First, we perform a counterfactual analysis in the case of monopolistic competition to match what has been achieved by with Bertrand competition. Second, in so doing we propose a multi-sector empirical implementation of the model by Melitz and Ottaviano (2005) , who obtain variable markups in a highly tractable asymmetric multi-country framework with monopolistic competition, thus overcoming some of the theoretical limitations of both the Bertrand and DixitStiglitz models. Our dataset covers aggregate and firm-level evidence on a panel of 11 EU countries. In this respect, to the best of our knowledge, this is the first analysis that uses comparable individual panel data across countries to investigate the gains from trade due to the selection effect. We find that EU trade has a sizeable impact on firm productivity. In 2000, if trade had been inhibited altogether, average productivity would have dropped by 13.3 per cent while a reversion of trade barriers to 1980 levels would have caused an average productivity loss of 4.6 per cent. In order of magnitude, our results are in line with those of cited above. They are slightly above those of Eaton and Kortum (2002) , who calculate the productivity loss associated with autarky below 10.3 per cent for a sample of 19 OECD countries in 1990. The fact that Eaton and Kortum (2002) do not have imperfect competition, that their base year pre-dates ours by a decade, and that OECD countries are generally less integrated than EU ones, may explain the difference. Finally, we also find that productivity gains vary a lot across countries and sectors depending on market accessibility and trade costs and we provide evidence that our results are robust to alternative distance and productivity measures. 2 1 Recent evidence on the existence of causation from trade to aggregate income and productivity is provided by Frankel and Rose (2002) , who find per capita income to be positively affected by the formation of currency unions, thanks to their positive impact on trade, and by Alcalà and Ciccone (2004) , who report strong support for a positive causal effect of trade on labor productivity. With respect to our analysis, Alcalà and Ciccone (2004) provide the interesting insight that, at an aggregate level of analysis, such a positive causation mainly acts through total factor productivity. 2 Differently from Computable General Equilibrium (CGE) models, our analysis is not conceived as an ex ante or
The rest of the paper is organized in six sections. Section 2 presents the theoretical model. Section 3 derives its equilibrium properties, then designs the calibration and simulation strategy. Section 4 describes the dataset. Section 5 calibrates the model. Section 6 simulates alternative integration scenarios while Section 7 provides several robustness checks. Section 8 concludes.
The model
Consider an economy with M countries, indexed by l = 1, ..., M. Country l hosts L l consumers, each supplying one unit of labor.
Preferences and Demand
Preferences are defined over S horizontally differentiated goods, indexed by s = 1, ..., S, and a homogenous good chosen as numeraire. Each differentiated good s is composed by a continuum of varieties indexed by i ∈ Ω s . All consumers share the same preferences in all countries and the same income in each country. The utility function for a representative consumer in country l is given by
where d l 0 and d l s (i) represent the individual consumption levels of the numeraire good and variety i of good s. The demand parameters α s , η s , and γ s are all positive. For each differentiated good s, the parameters α s and η s index the substitution pattern between its varieties and the numeraire: increases in α s and decreases in η s both shift out the demand for the differentiated varieties relative to the numeraire. The parameter γ s indexes the degree of product differentiation between the varieties of good s. In the limit when γ s = 0, consumers only care about their total consumption level over all varieties of that good, D l s = R i∈Ωs d l s (i)di. Such varieties are then perfect substitutes. The degree of product differentiation increases with γ s as consumers give increasing weight to the distribution of consumption levels across varieties.
The marginal utilities for all goods are bounded, and a consumer may thus not have positive demand for any particular good. We assume that consumers have positive demands for the numeraire good (d l 0 > 0). The inverse demand by country l for each variety i of good s is then given by p
whenever demand d l s (i) > 0. Let e Ω l s ⊂ Ω l s be the subset of varieties of good s consumed in country l. Then (2) can be inverted to yield the linear market demand system for these varieties:
where N l s is the measure of consumed varieties in e Ω l s andp l s =
The set e Ω l s is the largest subset of Ω l s that satisfies
ex post evaluation of the overall effects of a given policy, but rather as an exercise of comparative statics carried out under the ceteris paribus assumption. In particular, as our "gains from trade" stem only from the selection effect, our analysis is better understood as an attempt to capture the implications of endogenous productivity, which is usually taken as given by the CGE literature (Haaland and Norman,1992 ).
Any price above α s must violate this condition since the marginal utility in (2) is bounded above by α s ; hencep l s ≤ α s (the inequality must be strict when there is any price heterogeneity). For a given level of product differentiation γ s , lower average pricesp l s or a larger number of competing varieties N l s induce an increase in the price elasticity of demand and decrease the price bound (or choke price) defined in (4). On both counts, lowerp l s or a larger N l s generate a 'tougher' competitive environment.
Welfare can be evaluated using the indirect utility function associated with (1):
where I l and I l /L l are aggregate and per-capita incomes respectively, while σ 2
represents the variance of prices. To ensure positive demand levels for the numeraire, we assume that 
Production and Firm Behavior
Labor is the only factor of production and is inelastically supplied in a competitive market. The numeraire good is produced under constant returns to scale at unit cost. Its market is also competitive and perfectly integrated among countries. These assumptions imply a unit wage in all countries. Entry in each differentiated product sector is modeled as a research and development (R&D) process with uncertain outcome. Specifically, each entrant has to invent its own variety and a corresponding production process by making an irreversible investment of f E,s units of numeraire. In so doing a prospective entrant knows it is going to find a new variety for sure and that production will occur under constant returns to scale. It does know, however, the marginal cost of production c as this will be randomly determined only after investment in R&D has been sunk. In each country l and sector s uncertainty is modeled as a draw from a common and known distribution G l s (c), with support [0, c l M,s ], which varies across sectors and countries. This allows us to introduce (probabilistic) comparative advantage stemming from technological differences that affect the distribution of firm-level productivity draws. For example, if
countries l and h are said to have comparative advantages in sectors s and r respectively: relative to entrants in h (l), entrants in l (h) have a better chance of getting lower cost draws in sector s than in sector r. Since the entry cost f E,s is sunk, only firms that can cover their marginal cost survive and produce. All other entrants exit without even starting production. Surviving firms maximize their profits facing the demand function (3) . Given the continuum of competitors, a firm takes the average price levelp l s and numbers of firm N l s as given. This is the essence of monopolistic competition. Moreover, national markets are segmented, although firms can produce in one market and sell in the other, incurring a per-unit trade cost. The overall cost of a delivered unit with cost c from country h to country l is τ hl s c with τ lh s > 1, where (τ hl s − 1)c is the frictional trade cost. We interpret such cost in a wide sense as stemming from all distance-related barriers. For this reason, even within the country, trade may not be costless and we allow for τ ll s ≥ 1.
Let p lh s (c) and q lh s (c) represent the levels of the profit maximizing price and quantity sold for a firm in sector s producing in country l with cost c and selling to country h. Since national markets are segmented and firms produce under constant returns to scale, they independently maximize the profits earned from sales to different countries. Let π lh s (c) =
¤ q lh s (c) denote the maximized value of these profits as a function of the firm's marginal cost c. Then the profit maximizing prices and output levels must satisfy:
Only firms earning non-negative profits in a market will choose to sell in that market. This leads to similar cost cutoff rules for firms selling in either market. Let c lh s denote the upper bound cost for firms producing in country l and selling to country h. This cutoff must then satisfy:
This implies τ hl s c hl s = τ kl s c kl s , e.g. higher trade barriers from h to l make it harder for exporters from h to break even relative to their competitors from k. The cutoffs summarize all the effects of market conditions relevant for firm performance. In particular, the optimal prices and output levels can be written as:
which yield the following maximized profit levels:
Finally, entry is unrestricted in all countries. Firms choose a production location prior to entry and paying the sunk entry cost. Free entry of firms in country l implies zero expected profits in equilibrium, hence:
which, together with (6), determines the cost cutoffs c lh s . These cutoff, in turn, determine the numbers of sellers. Indeed, since τ lh s c lh s = p h s , (4) implies:
This yields the zero cutoff profit condition:
o is the average cost of surviving firms.
Equilibrium
We are now ready to determine the equilibrium distribution of firms across countries and the associated trade flows.
Parametrization of Technology
All the results derived in the previous section hold for any distribution of cost draws G l s (c). However, to implement the model empirically, we use a specific parametrization for that distribution whose empirical relevance will be then tested. In particular, we assume that in sector s and country l productivity draws 1/c follow a Pareto distribution with lower productivity bound 1/c l M,s and shape parameter k s ≥ 1. This implies a distribution of cost draws c given by
The shape parameter k s indexes the dispersion of cost draws and it is the same in all countries and sectors. When k = 1, the cost distribution is uniform on [0, c l M,s ]. As k s increases, the relative number of high cost firms increases, and the cost distribution is more concentrated at these higher cost levels. As k s goes to infinity, the distribution becomes degenerate at c l M,s . Any truncation of the cost distribution from above will retain the same distribution function and shape parameter k s . The productivity distribution of firms producing in l and selling to h will therefore also be Pareto with shape k s , and the truncated cost distribution will be given by G lh s (c) =
Production and Entry
measure the 'freeness' of trade for exports from l to h, which allows us to define the following trade freeness matrix for sector s:
Given our parametrization, the free entry condition (9) in country l can be rewritten as:
is an index of absolute advantage in sector s. This yields a system of M equations that can be solved for the M equilibrium domestic cutoffs in sector s using Cramer's rule:
where |P s | is the determinant of the trade freeness matrix and¯C lh s¯i s the cofactor of its ρ lh s element. Cross-country differences in cutoffs arise from three sources: own country size (L h ), as well as a combination of market access and comparative advantage (
. Countries benefiting from a larger local market, a better distribution of productivity draws, and better market accessibility have lower cutoffs.
The mass of sellers N l s in sector s and country l (including domestic producers in l and exporters to l) is still given by (10) . With a positive mass of entrants N l E,s in all countries, there are G l s (c ll s )N l E,s domestic producers and
is the export cutoff from h to l. This implies:
The latter provides a system of M linear equations that can be solved for the number of entrants in the M countries using Cramer's rule: 3
Given N l E,s entrants in country l, N l E,s G l s (c ll s ) firms survive and produce for the local market. Among the latter, N l E,s G l s (c lh s ) export to country h.
Trade Flows
Our model yields a gravity equation for aggregate bilateral trade flows. In sector s an exporter from l to h with cost c generates export sales r lh s (c) = p lh s (c)q lh s (c) where (see (6) and (7))
Aggregating these export sales r lh s (c) over all exporters from l to h (with cost c ≤ c lh s ) yields the aggregate bilateral exports in sector s from l to h: 4
This gravity equation determines bilateral exports as a log-linear function of bilateral trade barriers and country characteristics. As in Eaton and Kortum (2002) and Helpman, Melitz, and Rubinstein (2004), (14) reflects the joint effects of country size, technology (comparative advantage), and geography on both the extensive (number of traded goods) and intensive (amount traded per good) margins of trade flows. Similarly, (14) highlights how -holding the importing country size fixedtougher competition in that country (lower average prices, reflected by a lower c ll s ) dampens exports by making it harder for potential exporters to break into that market.
From Theory to Simulation
How large are the productivity gains of EU integration due to the impact of freer trade on competition and selection? Or, to put it differently, how large would be the "costs of non-Europe" due 3 We use the properties that relate the freeness matrix P and its transpose in terms of determinants and cofactors. 4 The integration measure G to foregone productivity gains? Our model can be used to address these questions. In so doing we build on equations (12) and (14) . Specifically, we proceed in two stages. We start with calibrating the model. Then we use the calibrated model to investigate the effects of different integration scenarios.
In the calibration stage, we first use trade and geographical data for the year 2000 to recover the sectoral freeness of trade (inversely related to trade costs) ρ lh s = ¡ τ lh s ¢ −ks from the gravity equation (14) . This allows us to get the freeness matrix P s and to compute its determinant and co-factors that appear in equation (12) . We then use a database on manufacturing firms belonging to 11 EU countries to estimate individual total factor productivities (TFP) for the year 2000. With such productivities we recover other two elements of equation (12): the shape parameter of the underlying Pareto distribution (k s ) and the M endogenous domestic cut-offs (c hh s ) for each sector. Using the computed values of P s , k s and c hh s together with data on population L h , we finally solve (12) to obtain the index of absolute advantage ψ l s up to a sector specific constant (due to f E,s and γ s ).
In the simulation stage, we run a counterfactual analysis on the calibrated model. In particular, we simulate the change in productivity induced by higher trade costs by recomputing c hh s for different freeness matrices P s . Two cases are considered. One in which international trade costs are prohibitive (ρ lh s = 0 for l 6 = h) and one in which the freeness of trade ρ lh s is calculated from 1980 trade data. The first case provides us with an assessment of the overall "gains from trade" (more precisely, losses from autarky). The second case gives a measure of the "costs of non-Europe" due to foregone productivity gains were intra-EU trade barriers to return to their 1980 level.
Data
In our empirical analysis we take the advantage of different datasets. As for productivity estimations, we extensively use the Amadeus database provided by the Bureau Van Dijk. This dataset gives (harmonized) yearly balance-sheet information on the biggest 250,000 European firms for the period 1994-2003. In particular, Amadeus provides information on the value added, fixed assets (capital), sales, and the cost of materials (intermediates consumption) in thousand of euros, as well as the number of employees. In the paper, we focus on manufacturing firms in western Europe for the year 2000. We choose the year 2000 because of the quality of the data and the fact that no major economic change took place in that year. We then consider only those countries for which a reasonable data coverage exists and we further eliminate missing values and extreme observations, defined as having either a capital/employees or value added/employees ratio which is out of the range identified by the 1st and the 99th percentile. This leaves us with a sample of 22,120 firms across 11 countries which are listed in Table 1 . 5 As one can see from Table 1 , data coverage for Germany, which is the biggest EU economy, is rather poor. This is the reason why we decided to complement our data with information coming from the MIP database on German firms provided by the ZEW. The MIP database has relatively smaller firms than the Amadeus. However, the productivity of German firms in the two samples is not much different and reveals that Germany is the most productive country. The MIP contains information on value added, employment, and input consumption. The capital variable has been reconstructed using the book value of capital in 1998 and adding investments at the end of the period as well as using the relevant deflators. Once eliminated missing as well as extreme observations, the MIP database provides us with a bit less than 700 firms. Although our results are virtually the same with Amadeus data only, the actual sample we use for estimations of productivity contains these additional firms. Descriptive statistics of the main variables used from this sample are give in Table 2 . We use this combined Amadeus-MIP database in order to estimate firm-level productivity for the year 2000 by means of simple OLS. However, one can wonder to what extent our results are robust to considering more accurate estimators of productivity. In order to address this concern, we also implement the Levinsohn and Petrin (2003) approach using intermediates consumption in order to control for unobservables. 6 As panel information is needed in this case, we build another dataset using years 1998, 1999 and 2000. When eliminating missing (as well as extreme) observations for intermediates consumption, the combined Amadeus-MIP sample of firms goes down to approximately 14,500 firms per year (for a total of 42,663 observations in the 3 years). This drop is mainly due to the fact that for Great Britain and Denmark there is no information available on firms' input consumption. Therefore, as detailed in Table 3 , the sample of countries that supports the Levinsohn-Petrin approach reduces to 9. Descriptive statistics of the main variables used from this second dataset are given in Table 4 .
As for the industry disaggregation, we work on a 18 sectors breakdown of manufacturing activities that comes out from merging the information contained in the two firm level databases - organized by 2-digits Nace rev. 1 that leads to 23 sectors for manufacturing -with that contained in the database we use to compute trade costs -organized by 3-digits ISIC rev 2 that leads to 26 manufacturing industries. The actual industry disaggregation used is detailed in Table 5 The data we use to compute trade costs are provided by the French research center CEPII (Centre d'Etude Prospectives et d'Informations Internationales). The main dataset, used in Mayer and Zignago (2005) , involves trade and production figures in a compatible ISIC 3-digit classification for a large set of countries over the 1976-2001 period. 7 These data allow us to recover both the internal (EXP ll s ) and the external (EXP lh s with l 6 = h) flows of goods. In order to estimate the freeness of trade ρ lh s from the gravity equation (14), we complement trade and production data with geographical variables, in particular bilateral distances and a common language indicator, which are also provided by CEPII. For both the common language and the distance variable many alternative measures are given in the CEPII dataset. A detailed description of how these variables are defined and computed is provided on the CEPII web-page. 8 In the paper, we focus on trade among 15 European countries and consider years 1979 to 1981 and 1999 to 2001 to reconstruct bilateral trade costs for our 11 countries in (respectively) 1980 and 2000. We decided to reconstruct trade costs using a larger set of countries (our 11 countries plus Austria, Greece, Ireland and Norway) in order to obtain a more accurate measure. For the 7 More details on the dataset are available at the CEPII web-page. See http://www.cepii.fr/anglaisgraph/bdd/TradeProd.htm. 8 See http://www.cepii.fr/anglaisgraph/bdd/distances.htm. Other manufacturing same reason, we take 3 years for each of the two points in time (1980 and 2000) . Table 6 The variable EXP lh s in Table 6 corresponds to trade flows (both internal and external) and is in thousands of US dollars. The common language variable is a dummy indicating whether a couple of countries share a common official language. 9 The distance variables are in km and can 9 In the CEPII database, there are two alternative common language indicators based on different definitions. One be divided into simple measures (dist and distcap) and weighted measures (distw and distwces).
Simple geodesic distances are calculated following the great circle formula, which uses latitudes and longitudes of the most important cities/agglomerations (in terms of population) for the dist variable and the geographic coordinates of the capital cities for the distcap variable. These two variables incorporate internal distances (d ll ) that like trade costs we allow to be non zero. They are based on the area of a country as in Head and Mayer (2004) . In particular, the formula used to convert area into distance is d ll = (2/3) p area l /π. This formula models the average distance between a producer and a consumer on a stylized geography where all producers are centrally located and the consumers uniformly distributed across a disk-shaped region. 10 By contrast, weighted distances use city-level data on distances and the geographic distribution of population (in 2004) inside each nation. The basic idea is to calculate the distance between two countries as the weighted average bilateral distance between their biggest cities with the corresponding weights determined by the shares of those cities in the overall national populations. This procedure can be used in a totally consistent way for both internal and international distances. Specifically, the general formula developed by Head and Mayer (2002) to calculate the distance between country l and h is:
where pop p (pop r ) designates the population of agglomeration p (r) belonging to country l (h). The parameter θ measures the sensitivity of trade flows to bilateral distance d pr . For the distw variable, θ is set equal to 1. The distwces calculation sets it equal to -1, which corresponds to the usual coefficient estimated from gravity models of bilateral trade flows. Our preferred distance variable is distw. We will show, however, in Section 7.3 that our results are robust to alternative measures of distance.
For some robustness checks, we use value added per hour worked in US dollars for our 11 countries by NACE rev.1 industries in the year 2000 as well as the corresponding total amount of hours worked in each country-sector. These data come (respectively) from the "Groningen Growth and Development Centre, ICOP Database 1997 Benchmark, http://www.ggdc.net" and the "Groningen Growth and Development Centre, 60-Industry Database, October 2004, http://www.ggdc.ne". Finally, data on population come from the New Cronos database provided by EUROSTAT. They refer to the year 2000 and the unit is thousand of inhabitants.
Calibration
To gauge the impact of trade openness on domestic productivity, we need to recover the parameters of the model and in particular those of equation (12) . We accomplish this task using trade and geographical variables, as well as balance sheet data on a sample of firms, for 11 EU countries.
Trade costs
The starting point of our estimation strategy is the gravity equation (14) , which will allow us to get the freeness of trade matrix P s , whose generic element is ρ lh s ≡ ¡ τ lh s ¢ −ks . From equation (14), one indicator considers that two countries share a common language as long as at least 20% of the two populations speaks that language. The other one is similar, but the percentage constrain is now between 9% and 20%. We experimented both alternatives getting similar results. (14) we thus get the following estimation equation:
where Border lh is a dummy variable that takes value one if l 6 = h (a crossing border effect). For each of the two estimations, we run a single regression in which we also put year and industry dummies. The coefficient on distances is industry specific, while the border effect is not (the border effect is by contrast country specific). We do not consider country-industry specific border effects because they impose too many parameters and their estimation would be inaccurate. It is important to stress that the specification used to estimate ρ lh s gives country-industry-sector specific transportation costs and that in general ρ lh s 6 = ρ hl s due to the border effects. Moreover, ρ ll is always less than one due to internal distances. A visual impression of how openness to international trade varies across countries is given by As for the sectoral variability of trade costs (which is essentially due to the δ s ), Table 7 reports the estimated distance coefficients for the year 2000. The values are in line with previous findings for Europe by Head and Mayer (2004) . In particular, Printing and Publishing as well as Petroleum and Coal are the least tradable goods while Textiles as well as Leather products and footwear are characterized by the smallest trade costs.
Total factor productivity
After calculating ρ lh s , we still have to recover the shape parameter of the underlying Pareto distribution of productivity (k s ), and the M endogenous domestic cut-off c hh s for each sector. For this we need to estimate the distributions of firm-level productivities for all sectors and countries. In most of the paper, we will rely on simple OLS estimations based on the regression
where V A i is value added, CAP i is capital (fixed assets), EM P L i is the number of employees of firm i and the sector/country indices have been dropped to alleviate the notation. The estimated productivity of firm i is thusP rod i,OLS = exp(ĉonst +ε i ). Nevertheless, as robustness check, in Section 7.1 we will show that a more sophisticated estimation methodology of firm productivity, based on Levinsohn and Petrin (2003), yields very similar results. OLS estimations of productivity are carried out separately for each of the 18 manufacturing industries considered. However, we do not make separate estimations by country assuming de facto that countries have the same technology up to a scale factor (Hicks neutral factor augmenting technology). The evidence provided by Trefler (1995) support this assumption for all countries in the sample except Portugal. 11 Note that our assumption does not imply that all countries use the same capital/labor ratio. If Germany is more capital abundant than Italy, then capital would be relatively cheaper in Germany with firms having a higher capital/labor ratio. The fact that we do not carry out separate estimations by countries has strong empirical advantages. First, it allows us to have a better measure of productivity as for some countries there are very few country-sector observations. Second, it avoids the following problem. If we found the sum of the coefficients a and b to differ between two countries, then our estimated average productivity would turn out to be higher in the country with the lower sum simply because this would map into a higher value of the constant. 12 Table 8 shows the average (across firms) OLS productivity by country, as well as the per capita income in PPS. 13 As one can see, the two measures are closely related, with the correlation being 0.61. Our OLS estimates of productivity are thus in line with aggregate figures even though Germany seems to be an issue. In fact, omitting Germany increases the correlation between productivity and GDP to 0.88. The reason behind this results is that both the Amadeus and the MIP databases have a strong bias towards West Germany firms, which are known to be much more productive. However, our results on the aggregate gains from trade are not very much sensitive to the exclusion of Germany and so we decided to keep it in the analysis. Figure 2 reports all our productivities by sector and countries. Now that we haveP rod i,OLS for all firms in the year 2000, we can use them to estimate the shape parameter k s of the Pareto distribution and the cutoffs c hh s . To estimate the former, it is useful to recall the following property. Consider a random variable X (our productivity) with observed cumulative distribution F (X). If the variable is distributed as a Pareto with shape parameter k s , then the OLS estimate of the slope parameter in the regression of ln(1 − F (X)) on ln(X) plus a constant is a consistent estimator of −k s and the corresponding R 2 should be close to one. 14 Table 9 shows the estimated k s and the R 2 of our regressions sector by sector. For all sectors the R 2 is far above 0.8, which shows that the Pareto is a fairly good approximation of the underlying productivity distributions, and the average k s is estimated to be close to 2. Large values of k s characterize sectors in which the productivity distribution is skewed towards relatively small and inefficient firms firms (Leather products and footwear, Wood products except furniture, Rubber and Plastic, Fabricated metal products, Machinery except electrical). Small values of k s are associated, instead, with an even distribution of firms across all productivity levels and sizes (Wearing apparel except footwear, Petroleum and coal, Chemicals, Professional and scientific equipment). 15 Turning to the cut-offs c hh s , these are country and sector specific. In the model, they represent the highest cost (or equivalently the reverse of the lowest productivity) of active domestic firms. The maximum likelihood estimator of the cut-off for a Pareto distribution is the minimum observed value. However, this is probably a rather unreliable method to implement with micro data because of extreme observations. Consequently, we prefer to use a moment estimator based on the formula of the mean of a Pareto. Specifically, if X (our productivity) is distributed as a Pareto with shape parameter k s and cut-off x then its mean is E(X) = x k s /(k s − 1). Using the country-sector average productivities and the previously estimated shape parameters, that formula can be inverted to recover all the productivity cut-offs, which are simply scaled average productivities. Finally, in order to pass from productivity cutoffs to cost cutoffs up, which are those needed in equation (12), we simply need to raise the cut-offs to the power of minus one. 16 
Simulation
We start with taking a logarithmic transformation of equation (12):
where a s = f E,s γ s , and b s = 2(k s + 1)(k s + 2)/L h . So far, we have data for ρ lh s (and so we know both C lh s and P s ), k s , c hh s , and L h (which is simply the population of county h). Therefore, we know everything about (18) except a s (which is industry specific only) and ψ l s (which is country and industry specific). However, a s is a log-linear term that simply cancels out when comparing (as we do) productivity scenarios obtained with different trade costs (ρ lh s ). For each sector we can thus set a s = 1 and solve the resulting non-linear system of 11 equations (18) This provides an assessment of the "costs of non-Europe" as measured by foregone productivity were intra-EU trade barriers to return to their 1980 level. Table 10 shows the average "gains from trade" by country. These are measured as minus percentage changes in mean productivity (i.e. percentage changes in the cutoff c hh s ) with respect to the estimate in the year 2000. Based on our simulations, autarky reduces average productivity by 13.32%. This is certainly a sizeable number and suggest that the selection effect is an important channel through which the benefits of international trade materialize. This number, however, varies considerably across countries. Germany, with 24.05%, is the country that gains the most, closely followed by Denmark (23.50%). At the other extreme, there is Great Britain with a mere 3.34% followed by Portugal (6.32%) and Italy (6.84%). According to our economic model, such gains are positively correlated (0.24), with openness to trade (seeρ h in the last column), so central countries gain more. Such correlation is not perfect because of comparative advantage and different trade costs across sectors.
Gains from trade
Turning to sectoral disaggregation, Table 11 shows the average gains from trade by industry and compares them with the elasticity of trade flows to distance (δ s ) as obtained from the sectoral gravity equations. As one can see, gains are positively correlated with the elasticity (0.73): the smaller the absolute value of the elasticity, the larger the corresponding gains.
Costs of non-Europe
Another interesting counterfactual allows to measure the "costs of non-Europe" as the losses in productivity that EU countries would suffer if their bilateral trade barriers reverse to their 1980 levels. Ideally, we would have liked to select the year of creation of the European Communities. Unfortunately, comparable trade data is not available for that year but only from 1980. That is why we deal with a 20-year flashback only. Table 12 shows the simulated losses (in absolute value) by country and compares them with the autarkic ones ("gains from trade"). Data for Belgium are missing because we do not have the corresponding trade data for 1980. As clear for the table, a considerable portion (36%) of the losses from autarky would already occur were EU integration regress to 1980. Such portion, however, varies a lot across countries. This can be seen in last column of the table, which shows costs of non-Europe as a share of the loss from autarky. As one would expect, Portugal and Spain, which joined the EU only in 1986, are the countries that in relative terms would lose more from non-Europe. For some combinations of sectors and countries, the simulated losses (not reported) are actually negative, meaning productivity benefits of non-Europe. The reason is that estimated trade elasticities to distance (δ s ) have increased in those sectors (especially food, wood products, metallic products, non-electric machinery, and professional and scientific equipment). This result is not new and it has been studied systematically by Disdier and Head (2004) . However, it is important to point out that, from 1980 to 2000, the overall freeness of trade (ρ lh s ) has still increased because of the fall of border effects (β h ).
Robustness checks
In this section we explore how sensitive our results are to alternative measures of productivity and distance as well as to alternative ways of recovering the shape parameter k s .
Individual productivity
In section 5.2 we estimated individual productivity as the exponential of the residual of a simple OLS regression of (the log of) value added on (the log of) capital and labor. All the results obtained so far are based on that estimate. We now repeat the analysis relying on a different estimation procedure. The aim is to assess the robustness of our findings when one takes into account the possible presence of a simultaneity bias in the OLS estimate. The main idea is that a firm hires capital and labor after having observed the realization of its random TFP. The larger the realization, the larger the quantities of inputs hired. As long as the realization is unobservable to the econometrician, the regressors in (17) are thus correlated with the residual of the OLS regression. The bias can be removed by identifying an observable proxy variable and introducing it as an additional regressor in (17) . The proxy is such that, according to economic theory, it can be expected to respond to the TFP realization observed only by the firm. Accordingly, the residual of the new regression is free from any correlation with the inputs due to the asymmetric observability of realized TFP. This approach, originally proposed by Olley and Pakes (1996) using investment as a proxy, has been recently extended by Levinshon and Petrin (2003) (henceforth LP) using intermediate inputs instead. Data availability forces us to choose the latter proxy since for our sample of Amadeus firms there is no information available on investment. Moreover, as information on the cost of materials is not available for Denmark and Great Britain, also the LP procedure can be implemented on a sample of 9 countries only. That is why we preferred to rely on OLS in our benchmark analysis. 17 The LP estimates for the year 2000 are reported in Table 13 , which shows the average productivity by country. 18 Although absolute levels are quite different, the correlation between the OLS and LP estimates within a sector is around 0.9, so the two estimates differ only for a scaling factor, which is innocuous for our counterfactual analysis. Still, a problem seems to appear for Germany and Sweden, which are respectively too much and too little productive in the LP estimates with respect to the OLS ones. Tables 14, 15 and 16 show the results of our counterfactuals when LP rather than OLS productivities are used to calibrate the model. The two former tables report the "gains from trade" for countries and sectors respectively. The latter displays the "costs of non-Europe". To ease comparison, we also report the OLS results in the same countries and sectors. 19 The tables show that results are largely consistent between the LP and OLS simulations. On average the gains from trade decrease, but this is to be expected because there are missing countries in the LP sample and so smaller potential benefits from trade. Moreover, the average productivity loss due to 1980 barriers still represent about 30% of the average loss due to autarky. Finally, according to our LP simulations, the Netherlands would actually see their average productivity increase, were trade barriers set at their 1980 levels. This is again the result of the fact that in some sectors the elasticity of trade flows to distance (δ s ) has increased since 1980.
Aggregate productivity
As shown in Table 1 , data coverage in Amadeus data is for some countries, like Denmark, Germany, and Portugal, not very satisfying. As for Germany, we have complemented our data with additional firm level information coming from the MIP provided by the ZEW. Nevertheless, even if we eventually succeed in having a good sample of German firms, an issue of representativeness of our productivities due to small sample size still remains for other countries. Moreover, one can also argue that since Amadeus data are generally biased towards big firms, the issue of representativeness applies to virtually all countries. In order to address both concerns, we have performed our simulation exercise using countrysector productivities, provided by the "Groningen Growth and Development Centre, ICOP Database 1997 Benchmark, http://www.ggdc.net", in order to recover a more reliable measure of domestic cutoffs c hh s that, under the pareto distribution assumption, are just a scaling of the corresponding average productivity. In particular, these aggregate data provide us with the (producer) price adjusted value added per hour worked for each of the 18x11 country-sector pairs in US dollars for the year 2000. 20 These data represents the most accurate and comparable existing measures of international productivities and are based on a very large firm coverage. Moreover, compared to our individual productivities, they have the further advantage of being deflated by industry-specific purchasing power parities. The ICOP data can thus account for the fact that prices vary across countries giving a more reliable measure of "physical" productivity. Nevertheless, the drawback of these data is the fact that they do not take into account capital intensity as we instead do when using individual TFP. Tables 17 and 18 show the result we obtained using the ICOP database and compare them to our baseline OLS individual TPF simulations. 21 The average gains from trade in Table 17 increase from 13.32% to 18.57%. Nevertheless, the difference between the ICOP and OLS simulations is mainly 2 0 We actually combined the ICOP Industrial Database (New Benchmarks) that gives us such productivities, with the 60-Industry Database, provided by the "Groningen Growth and Development Centre, 60-Industry Database, October 2004, http://www.ggdc.ne", that gives us the number of total hours worked. Data are originally organized with the Nace rev.1 classification and has been converted into our 18 industries disaggregation by weighting productivities by the total number of hours worked in each Nace industry. 2 1 When simulating gains with ICOP data we use the same ks obtained from OLS based productivity distributions. a matter of scale because the correlation between the respective gains is 0.89 (0.51) if Germany is excluded (included). Although the average gain from trade may be actually underestimated by our baseline OLS simulation, these results suggest that an issue of representativeness eventually exists for Germany only. Indeed in the ICOP database (where data coverage for Germany is as good for the former East Germany as for West Germany), German firms are much less productive with respect to other countries than in our individual data. This intuition is further confirmed by the costs of non-Europe in Table 18 , which are higher in the ICOP simulation but still pretty much correlated (0.44) with the OLS ones as long as Germany is excluded.
Trade costs
So far we have worked with a specific bilateral distance metric (distw). This makes use of internal distances on whose calculation there is no general consensus. Therefore, one may wonder how our results would be affected by changing the measurement of internal distances. Our spatial data provide us with three alternative measures of bilateral distances (distswces, dist, and distcap) that use different approximations for internal ones. The details of such measures are provided in Section 4 and we perform simulations based on each of them to check for the robustness of our benchmark results. Moreover, as some scholars do not agree on the use of internal distances preferring the rather unrealistic assumption ρ ll s = 1, we also provide results obtained neglecting internal distances while adequately re-scaling the unit of international distances. 22 Tables 19 and 20 show that, no matter how internal distances are measured, results are essentially unchanged (columns 3 to 6). This is especially true for the gains from trade that remain rather stable across all distance specifications. As for the costs of non-Europe, all simulations are generally consistent with each other with the only exception of the results obtained with distcap. Such variable measures international distances based on the location of capital cities only and it is certainly the less accurate distance measure we have in this group. When internal distances are neglected (column 7), the loss associated with autarky is quite larger (19.45%). This is not surprising because neglecting internal distances amounts to set border effects to zero, thus increasing the observed international openness. Consequently, going back 2 2 With no internal distances, the freeness of trade ρ lh s is still computed on the basis of equation 16 with international distances based on distw. However, only observations for which l 6 = h are considered and borders effects are not anymore identifiable. Moreover, to make ρ lh s economically comparable to the assumed ρ ll s = 1, we have re-scaled the unit of measurement of distance in such a way that, once computing trade costs with internal distances, the average ρ ll s is equal to one for each sector. To this respect, it is important to point out that the value of ρ lh s has no "absolute" meaning because the of the arbitrariness in the choice of the distance unit. More precisely, the unit of measurement of distance (that affects the scale of both ρ ll s and ρ lh s ) has no effect on simulated gains as long as internal distances are considered because it is just a multiplicative effect for the entire matrix P s . What matters in the calculation is in fact the ratio between ρ ll s and ρ lh s that determines the "relative" degree of international openness and so the contribution of foreign competition to selection. to autarky becomes more costly. Moreover, setting ρ ll s = 1 induces a further bias underestimating (overestimating) the degree of internal freeness of trade in small (large) countries and thus increasing (decreasing) the relative importance of international trade for competition and selection. This is why small countries like Belgium and the Netherlands gain much more from trade when all ρ ll s are set to 1. Turning to the costs of non-Europe, they are rather small (0.9%) when internal distances are neglected. Again, this is related to the absence of border effects that are the main drivers of trade costs reduction in a world where the elasticity of trade to distance (δ s ) appears to be increasing over time. 23 
Shape parameter
The final issue we address is the calibration of the shape parameter of the underlying Pareto distribution of productivity draws (k s ). As argued by , individual TFP productivityP rod i is certainly measured with an error. Even if we believe that such an error is uncorrelated with the "true" productivity P rod i , it should deflate the value of k s . 24 In other words, measurement errors may induce us to observe too much TFP variability across firms so that our k s (whose average in OLS estimations is 2.095) would be too low. An alternative solution, followed by , is to reconstruct the parameters of the distribution of productivity from aggregate numbers. In particular, using data for the US, recover the shape parameter of their Fréchet distribution (they call it θ) by matching the productivity and size advantage of exporters between simulated and actual data. Such methodology allows them to solve the issue of the measurement error at the cost of imposing more structure. One has to believe not only that the productivity has a certain distribution, but also that all other assumptions (demand, market structure, etc.), which are needed to obtain the average productivity of exporters, hold. While we believe that our approach is more reliable, we find it useful to check how sensitive our results are with respect to this issue.
Unfortunately, we do not have reliable export data in the Amadeus database and so we can't obtain neither the size nor the productivity advantage of exporters. Therefore, we simply try the value k s = 3.6 obtained by , which is unique since they do not have different sectors. It is important to remark that the Fréchet distribution of Bernard et al. (2003) is not incompatible with the Pareto we use. Indeed, in their model where only the lowest cost supplier is active in any particular country, if all potential suppliers draw their costs from an unobservable Pareto distribution with shape parameter k s , then the corresponding observable extreme value distribution is precisely a Fréchet with shape parameter k s .
There is, however, another issue to consider for our k s . If we take more seriously the market structure of our model, we should introduce some sort of price correction when estimating productivities that would probably change k s in the opposite direction. Indeed, in our setting more (physically) productive firms set lower prices (both national and international), so they do not entirely translate their higher productivity into higher values of sales per worker. Therefore, conventional estimations of TFP, which, like ours, are based on the value of sales or value added, should underestimate (overestimate), the productivity of more (less) productive firms thus reducing the observed variance of productivity and overstating k s . This is confirmed by Foster, Haltiwanger and Syverson (2005) , who propose the only TFP research we know that takes the advantage of firm-level physical quantities. They find that at plant level physical productivities are inversely correlated with prices. This implies that the standard error of (the ln of) revenue-based TFP is lower than the one of the output-based TFP, as predicted by our model. Moreover, Foster, Haltiwanger and Syverson (2005) find that the correlation between revenue-based and output-based TFP's is not negligible (0.64), whereas the bias in terms of standard errors of (the ln of) productivities, which is all that matters for our k s , is rather small (20%). 25 Tables 21 and 22 respectively show the gains from trade and the costs of non-Europe obtained by either reducing k s by 20% or setting k s = 3.6 (i.e. increasing k s by 70%) and compare them with our baseline results. Keeping in mind that the average OLS k s is 2.095, one may first note that the gains from trade do not change monotonically with k s . Both reducing and increasing k s slightly raise the average gains from trade although not in all countries. The reason why the gains from trade depends non monotonically with k s is not trivial. With a higher k s , there are more potential gains from fiercer international competition because the cost distribution shifts towards low productive firms and so there are more bad firms to kill for any given degree of international openness. However, as k s increases, only few firms can manage to operate in international markets and the "perceived" degree of international openness ρ lh s = ¡ τ lh s ¢ −ks decreases. On the other hand, looking at the costs of non-Europe reveals that they fall slightly when lowering k s by 20%, while they increase substantially when setting k s = 3.6 where they represents roughly 49% of the gains from trade. Overall, our simulations suggest that correcting the bias of 20% would only slightly change our results, whereas adopting the Bernard et al. (2003) estimate k s = 3.6 would increase substantially only the costs of non-Europe.
Conclusion
We have calibrated a multi-country multi-sector model with heterogeneous firms, monopolistic competition and variable markups on firm-level data and trade figures for a panel of 11 EU countries. When simulating different integration scenarios, we have found that in the year 2000 an increase of trade barriers to prohibitive levels would have caused an average productivity loss of roughly 13 %, with a third of the effect already occurring if barriers had risen to 1980 levels. This shows that the darwinian selection of the best firms is an important effect of trade liberalization. We have also found that such effect varies a lot across countries and sectors depending on their market accessibility and trade costs respectively. We have finally provided evidence that our results are robust to alternative distance and productivity measures. 
